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court," and the court accordingly held that the unrestricted right to
appeal does not guarantee due process.
The concurring opinion by Judge Calhoun in the principal case
presents two additional grounds, not argued in the case, upon which
the legislative enactment in question might have been held uncon-
stitutional. W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 5, provides in part: "The
legislature shall provide for the support of free schools by appropriat-
ing thereto ... the net process of all forfeitures and fines accruing
to this State under the laws thereof." The statute in the principal
case provided that fines assessed shall be remitted to a designated
account, and the balance, if any, after paying specified expenses,
"shall become a part of the regular county general fund." This
completely diverts fines from the school system. In State v. Parkins,
63 W. Va. 385, 61 S.E. 337 (1908), a statute providing that game
wardens should receive as compensation all fines assessed by them
was held to be in violation of article XII, section 5 of the West
Virginia Constitution. The act in the present case further provided,
in section 5, that "the judge of any court of record exercising ap-
pellate jurisdiction from a justice court ... may, in absence, sickness,
or inability of a justice to act, appoint a special justice to sit during
the absence." W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 30, provides in part:
"Vacancies in the office of . . . justices of the peace, shall be filled
by the county court of the county until the next election." The
case of State ex rel. Neal v. Barron, 120 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1961),
held the quoted provisions of the Constitution as mandatory, and
that vacancies were not to be filled in any manner other than by
the county court. The concurring opinion in the principal case should
be closely noted by those who anticipate future drafting of legisla-
tion in this area.
John Everett Busch
Criminal Law-Defense of Others
Upon hearing cries for help, D discovered two men choking
and kicking a third man who was lying on the ground. D fired four
shots with his rifle wounding both assailants. At the trial, the jury
was instructed that ". . . before one person has the right to use
force in the defense or aid of another, the circumstances must be
such that the person on whom the assault is being made has the
right of self-defense." The jury found D guilty of atrocious assault
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and battery with a dangerous weapon, and he appealed. Held, re-
versed and remanded. D should have been acquitted if his conduct
was justified upon the facts as he reasonably concluded them to be,
both in relation to the gravity of the threat, and to the extent of
the force necessary, and not on the basis of the apparent victim's
right of self-defense. State v. Chiarello, 174 A.2d 506 (N.J. Super.
1961).
The principal case presents an interesting problem over which
the courts are in discord. The conflict is between those advocating
the "alter ego" rule as espoused by the trial court, and those ad-
vocating the reasonable mistake of fact doctrine upon which the
New Jersey Superior Court rests its decision. This conflict is difficult
enough, but it gains complexity when the common-law right to
prevent the commission of a felony is considered in conjunction
with, or as an alternative to, the common-law right to use force
in the defense of others.
Perkins states that the proper view of the common law is that
the "alter ego" rule is only correct when all the facts are known
to the defender, but when the defender acts in good faith and in
ignorance of the other's fault, then such a defender is justified if
he is acting on reasonable appearances. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW
910, 11 (1957). Although there is case law in conflict with Perkins'
position, most writers and some cases bring forth similar views.
Frew v. Teagarden, 111 Kan. 107, 205 Pac. 1023 (1922); White
v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1960); State v. Wiseman,
94 W. Va. 224, 118 S.E. 139 (1939); 2 BuRnicK, LAW OF CRIME
§ 437 (1946); 6 C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 93 (1937).
One rationale suggested by the proponents of the reasonable
mistake of fact doctrine is that one who defends in good faith and
under a reasonable mistake of facts can not be guilty of a crime
because he lacks the requisite intent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05
(1), comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). The proponents of the
"alter ego" rule, in turn, contend that adhering to the reasonable
mistake of fact doctrine would sometimes result in injury or death
to innocent persons without criminal liability. Although the policy
of the law is undoubtedly adverse to permitting injury or death
without criminal liability when such liability is present, it would
also appear that there is a counter-balancing policy which encourages
the protection of innocent men who are attacked.
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The common law recognizes the privilege to use force to pre-
vent the commission of a felony or of a misdemeanor which amounts
to a breach of the peace, but deadly force may only be used when
it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a dangerous felony.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 881 (1957). The established rule is that
the reasonable mistake of fact doctrine applies to the right to use
force to prevent the commision of felonies and misdemeanors which
amount to a breach of the peace. Spicer v. People, 11 Ill. App. 294
(1882); 2 BuRmDIcK, LAW OF CRIME § 437 (1946); PERKiNs,
CRIMINAL LAW 910 (1957). It is obvious that situations could
arise wherein both the right to use force in the defense of others
and the right to use force to prevent the commission of a felony
would be available to the intervener as defenses. In that case, the
supporters of the "alter ego" rule would be in the anomalous posi-
tion of denying the reasonable mistake of fact doctrine if the former
defense were used, yet upholding it if the latter defense were
interposed.
Another inconsistent position often taken with regard to the
right to use force in the defense of others concerns what persons
an intervener may defend. "Although Lord Hale and others appear
sometimes to intimate a distinction in these respects between the
cases of servants and friends and that of a mere stranger, yet it
must be confessed that the limits of both are nowhere accurately
defined." 2 BuRDICK, LAW OF CRIME § 437 (1946). Burdick's
statement may no longer be entirely accurate because many juris-
dictions have enacted legislation specifically stating the relationship
necessary between the intervener and the person allegedly assaulted
before the intervener may successfully interject his defense of that
individual. There is a significant lack of uniformity among these
statutes. See the compilation in MODEL PENAL CODE app. A (14)
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
However, the wide variety of relationships required by the
statutes and the lack of clarity on this point where no statute is in
effect has little practical significance in the typical case. For, in
most instances where the defense of others might be invoked, the
complementary defense of the right to use force to prevent a felony
is also available. The latter defense does not require any relation-
ship between the apparent victim and the intervener. Therefore, by
discarding the defense of others and interposing the defense of the
use of force to prevent a felony, the intervener circumvents both the
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artificial distinctions made by the statutes and the uncertainty at-
tributable to the common law on this point, and thereby makes
discussion of these distinctions largely an academic matter. The
reasoning which supports the maintenance of these special relation-
ships seems obscure. But the rule, vague as it may be, still exists.
40 C.J.S. Homocide § 108 (1944). However, this requirement has
seemingly been abandoned in England where its uncertain roots lie.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05, comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
In the United States, statements can be found to the effect that
strangers may be defended. State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800, 819
(1883). But the Greer case involved brothers, consequently the
statement about strangers is dictum as are many similar statements
in cases in this area.
The logical solution to this problem would appear to be the
one adopted by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958). This solution grants the intervener the right to use such
force in the defense of others, including strangers, as he could use
in his own defense with the provision that the reasonable mistake
of fact doctrine will apply both in regard to the amount of force
necessary and in regard to the fault, or lack thereof, of the apparent
victim who is being defended.
Charles Henry Rudolph, Jr.
Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Indictment for Conspiracy to
Murder
D was indicted for the murder of X and upon the trial of that
offense the jury was unable to agree and was discharged. Subse-
quently, a joint indictment was returned against D and four other
persons charging them with conspiracy to murder X, and also
charging the murder of X. Upon the separate trial of D on the
indictment for conspiracy the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.
D was discharged in that proceeding and the circuit court fixed a
date for the second trial of D upon the original indictment for
murder. D filed a plea of former jeopardy and prayed that he be
released and discharged from the charge of murder in the first
indictment. The circuit court held D's plea of former jeopardy to
be insufficient in law and D asked for a writ of prohibition from
the West Virginia Supreme Court to prevent him from being twice
put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense. Held, writ
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